

MR Book Reviews

SOLDIER-ARTIST OF THE GREAT RECONNAISSANCE: John C. Tidball and the 35th Parallel Pacific Railroad Survey, Eugene C. Tidball, University of Arizona Press, Tucson, 2004, 226 pages, \$39.95.

Eugene C. Tidball, a distant relative of Lieutenant John C. Tidball (1825-1906)—the prime subject of this book—is a lawyer by trade, and an extensive biographer. A careful and meticulously written history, *Soldier-Artist* is a refreshing reexamination of the 1853 Arkansas-to-California railroad expedition conducted under the guidance of a survey team headed by Amiel Whipple.

Following the 35th parallel, the expedition set out to map feasible routes and note potential obstacles to a transcontinental railroad. Tidball was assigned to provide security for the team, which consisted of scientists, soldiers, artists, and guides. Tidball's talent as a sketch artist and memoirist proved an unexpected windfall for one of the most important explorations of the American Southwest.

Amplifying our interest in a book about an expedition from two centuries ago is Tidball's newly discovered memoirs. Many of the book's chapter titles are taken from incisive remarks in Tidball's writings: "We Will Be on Mule Meat Before We are Through"; "The Clothes of the Murdered Mexican Were Riddled with Arrows." Yet the author is not solely retelling Tidball's experiences; he also examines and redacts the works of several other participants. The result is a multifaceted history.

Throughout the text, the author features John Tidball's amazing descriptions of weather, topography, flora and fauna, and the responses of Native Americans to this odd conglomerate of men. (The expedition's interaction with the Mojave Indians, who worked on railroads in succeeding decades,

is worth a separate study.) The team's long, arduous journey took them through dangerous, beautiful, and little-explored terrain. The author gives insightful descriptions of America's vast landscape and includes several examples of John Tidball's sketches and drawings.

The ambitious survey to find the best route for a rail system cost thousands of dollars—a lot of money then, but was the expedition a success? Readers might conclude that the artist's drawings were the greatest contribution to the whole adventure.

This well-researched and well-documented book is a vital contribution to the literature of America's westward expansion, despite the fact that the author falls into the old trap of claiming that the region was "without history," a philosophical construct often debated among scholars of that era.

In the end, *Soldier-Artist* records the consummate American travelogue of the 1850s American Southwest. Readers with a wider interest in the subject should consider Kevin M. DeLuca's *Trains in the Wilderness: The Corporate Roots of Environmentalism* (Rhetoric & Public Affairs, Winter 2001) and Patricia Limerick's *Desert Passages: Encounters With the American Desert* (University of New Mexico Press, Albuquerque, 2001).

**MAJ Jeffrey C. Alfier,
Ramstein AB, Germany**

THE IDEAS THAT CONQUERED THE WORLD: Peace, Democracy, and Free Markets in the Twenty-First Century, Michael Mandelbaum, PublicAffairs, New York, 2003, 506 pages, \$18.00.

Several years ago, in *The End of History and the Last Man* (Penguin, New York, 1992), Francis Fukuyama predicted the end of history, by which he meant new history-altering ideas. Capital-

ism and its accompaniments had conquered. Michael Mandelbaum builds on the theme, claiming that for the first time there are no competing systems to "peace, democracy, and free markets." After three wars (two world and one cold), the liberal system has prevailed.

As an unabashed 19th-century free-trading liberal (not to be confused with a 20th-century welfare liberal), Mandelbaum discusses rival economic theories—mercantilism and neomercantilism, communism and socialism—and finds that economist and philosopher Adam Smith's ideas regarding free trade still trump all command economic theories.

Trade makes wealth; trade barriers do not. Free trade disrupts locally, but generates wealth globally. It promotes democracy as new wealth brings new participants to the political process. Sadly, because politics interferes with markets, absolute free trade is politically impossible. Free trade and democracy promote peace because trading partners do not fight each other, and democracies tend to frown on war more than do absolute systems such as monarchies, despotisms, and such others.

Mandelbaum has the right credentials: eight books on foreign policy, a named chair at Johns Hopkins, and an affiliation as senior with the Council on Foreign Relations. He naturally has a good grasp of world politics and economy. His history, however, is sometimes suspect: Some of his claims are not necessarily wrong, but they are certainly open to dispute. For example, he wrongly credits Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev instead of U.S. President Ronald Reagan for the fall of the Soviet Union.

Commonly, books written shortly before 9/11 seem a bit overcome by events. Analyses and prognostications of even 4 years ago, closely argued and plausible at the

time, get slapped in the face by a world reality that belies theory.

Mandelbaum survives, and he updates his book to address the rise of terrorism and neocon foreign policy. Unlike those who saw a sea of change after 9/11, Mandelbaum interprets the American-British invasion of Iraq as part of the ongoing remaking of peripheral states into something akin to the freetrading democracies of the core. If Mandelbaum is correct, then today's insurgency is merely a resistance doomed to failure. History will continue to march toward a nirvana of freetrading, disarmed democracies living in a harmonious world.

This book is not as much a tightly documented fact-after-endless-fact history of the rise of capitalism as it is an extended essay that uses evidence as appropriate to buttress its case. At least Mandelbaum has no ax to grind—just an important point to make. His book deserves to be taken seriously. His ideas are well developed and plausible, and if he is correct, then the disasters of the past several years are the last gasp of an already dead old order, not indicators of a changing world order.

**John H. Barnhill, Ph.D.,
Houston, Texas**

M: MI5's First Spymaster, Andrew Cook, Tempus Publishing Limited, Gloucestershire, United Kingdom, 2004, 287 pages, \$30.00.

M: MI5's First Spymaster is the absorbing biography of William Melville, the founding father of the British Secret Service (MI5) and the man who came to be known as the original "M." Drawing on declassified accounts and interviews with Melville's family and the descendants of those who played central roles, Andrew Cook skillfully portrays the diverse, intriguing life of Britain's first spymaster. Cook, a renowned British historian and intelligence expert, purports that Melville was "one of the most influential counter-espionage fig-

ures of the twentieth century."

While of limited utility for today's intelligence community, Melville's story is intriguing. During his career, he was involved in many of London's high-profile crime dramas, including the Jack the Ripper investigations. He also successfully countered Irish Republican Army terrorism, assassination attempts on Queen Victoria, and anarchist bomb plots.

After his secret transfer to the war office, Melville deftly coordinated the recruitment and coordination of foreign and domestic agents—arguably his greatest achievement. It is little wonder that in the James Bond novels Ian Fleming used Melville as his model for "M."

M is carefully researched and offers engaging insights into a man who contributed significantly to Britain's homeland security. Cook provides a balanced, if on occasion overly sympathetic, portrayal of an elusive, yet remarkable man. Alas, *M* has one small shortcoming: Cook fails to reveal the hazards and tension that accompanied many of the events he describes. This is disappointing for the lay reader, but overall, *M* is an enjoyable study.

**MAJ Andrew M. Roe,
British Army,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

HITLER'S SPY CHIEF: The Wilhelm Canaris Mystery, Richard Bassett, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 2005, 319 pages, \$32.95.

One of the enduring issues of World War II concerns the failure of the German opposition to Adolf Hitler. If, as many sympathetic observers contend, large numbers of decent Germans opposed the Nazi regime, how did that regime hold power until the very moment the country was overrun by Allied forces? At the heart of this debate is the case of Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, who was until 1944 head of the military intelligence service (Abwehr) while also being a senior

member of the secret opposition.

Richard Bassett portrays the young Canaris as a brilliant naval officer and secret agent during World War I who later established his conservative credentials as a paramilitary leader during the social chaos of post-1918 Germany. While Bassett acknowledges that Canaris was one of many Germans who willingly supported Hitler during the 1930s and, in fact, remained a supporter for some time, Bassett also provides an excellent explanation of the odd, but enduring, friendship between Canaris and his competitor Reinhard Heydrich, head of the Nazi security service. The two men remained neighbors and had frequent social contact even after Heydrich's ruthless deceptions and covert actions had contributed to Canaris's revulsion against Hitler's regime. The study also details the espionage successes of the Abwehr to argue against the frequent criticism of that agency as a group of clumsy amateurs.

If this beautifully written work has a flaw, it is Bassett's eagerness to portray his subject as the key leader of the Nazi opposition. He explains the continued success of the Abwehr not just as an example of Canaris's professionalism and patriotism, but as part of his hero's efforts to maintain the agency's power in anticipation of a future coup against Hitler.

The book also dwells at length on Canaris's secret efforts to obtain Allied promises of support for any German opposition group that seized power. To further bolster his premise, Bassett devotes eight pages to the unproven possibility that Canaris met secretly in Spain for peace talks with his British opposite number, Sir Stewart Menzies.

Bassett credits Kim Philby, a Soviet mole inside the British Secret Service, for skillfully thwarting the German-British negotiations for a separate peace. Still, although such arguments seem somewhat labored, Bassett does not exceed the boundaries of historical evidence with regard to his suppositions.

Overall, *Hitler's Spy Chief* is a highly readable and entertaining account of a career officer wrestling with the conflicting demands of professionalism, patriotism, and morality. Soldiers and general readers alike will find this a rewarding book.

**COL Jonathan M. House,
USAR,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

WASHINGTON ON WASHINGTON, Paul M. Zall, ed., University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, 2003, 164 pages, \$26.00.

In *Washington on Washington*, Paul M. Zall enlightens the reader through Washington's own words. Zall asserts that there is a significant difference between the way Washington viewed himself and the way others viewed him. The difficulty in defining Washington's true character comes from his penchant for privacy.

Extensively researched and masterfully written, the book focuses on key events and writings from Washington's life, including advice he gave to his granddaughter Nelly and how he fought against poor discipline and morale problems among his troops. Washington's political experience before the war allowed him to see how the attitudes at the policymaking level affected the military. He wrote: "The [h]onor and [s]uccess of the army, and the safety of our bleeding [c]ountry, depends on harmony and good agreement with each other."

Washington's leadership style was about winning the war, and not about the violence of war. He wished for peace, but he wanted a lasting peace under freedom that would allow him to return to his home and family. Despite his tactical manner of leadership, he was strategically aware enough to recognize the origins of the British Army's power—what we call the center of gravity.

In such a short tome, it is difficult to imagine a significant treatment of Washington's life.

Yet, without all the accompanying historical happenings, Zall has succeeded in capturing the essence of our country's Father.

**LTC Devin Swallow, USAF,
Langley AFB, Virginia**

SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda, Romeo Dallaire, Carroll & Graf Publishers, New York, 2004, 563 pages, \$16.95.

The world is just now coming to grips with the nightmare that occurred in Rwanda. In April 1994, the ugly civil war between the Hutu majority and Tutsi minority flared into 100 days of violence in which Hutu extremists murdered over 800,000 Tutsi and Hutu moderates. No better account of this epic tragedy exists than Romeo Dallaire's *Shake Hands With The Devil*.

Dallaire, who commanded the Canadian Defence Force, describes how he tried to prevent the Hutus' brutality and how functionaries at the UN all but ignored his warnings. Readers with military experience will feel Dallaire's frustration as he dealt with complicated, inadequately resourced, and logistically constrained command structures while not receiving adequate guidance.

Dallaire is candid about his thoughts and actions and about the challenges of commanding a multinational command structure that was ill-prepared for Rwanda's horror. Dallaire is also open about his own personal cost as a result of living through the hell that visited Rwanda. His emotional struggle (now known as posttraumatic stress disorder) is relevant given what U.S. soldiers currently face in Iraq. I hope his story helps readers understand the effects of the disorder.

**LTC Timothy McKane, USA,
Retired, Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas**

NAPOLEON: A Political Life, Steven Englund, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2004, 474 pages, \$35.00.

In the modern biographical literature on Napoleon Bonaparte that has stood the test of time are David G. Chandler's comprehensive *The Campaigns of Napoleon* (Scribner, New York, 1973) and Felix Markham's cogent biographical masterpiece *Napoleon* (Signet Books, New York, 1988).

Former Marshall Scholar Steven Englund notes in his beautifully written book *Napoleon: A Political Life* that the allure of Napoleon the military phenomenon has tended to overwhelm our interest in Napoleon the politician, despite the huge effect Napoleon's political activities had in their day (and continue to have in our own). Englund emphasizes that his book reinterprets Napoleon as a modern political phenomenon because Napoleon is the archetype of the modern political man.

Englund returns to the pro and con of the debate about Napoleon's political stature, which he sees as an attempt either to further elevate Napoleon's divine status or whittle him down to size. In short, Englund brings both a Whig and "Great man" method to Napoleon the politician. The topic allows Englund to indulge in additional explorations of his own area of historical expertise, modern nationalism, when he can compare Napoleon the Corsican patriot to Napoleon the French nationalist—with interesting results.

Although the book is exquisitely researched, little of its information is new. (Englund identifies minor new tidbits in his accompanying bibliographical essay.) What are new and unique are Englund's interpretations. His command of the Napoleonic literature, especially of French resources, is encyclopedic. He also makes excellent use of Napoleon's writings and brings to light many of his lesser known early political essays.

I highly recommend this book for all would-be politicians and/or practitioners of military art. The book shows the heights and depths

a rare, exceptional human being can achieve.

**CDR John T. Kuehn, USN,
Retired, Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas**

MEN OF STEEL: 6 ARMoured DIVISION IN THE 1965 WAR: War Dispatches of Major General Abrar Husain, Army Education Publishing House, Rawalpindi, and Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2005, 153 pages, Unpriced.

Men of Steel, composed of the war dispatches of Pakistan's 6 Armored Division's commander, Major General Abrar Husain, was written 4 months after the Battle of Chawinda, the battle that decided the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War. Although Chawinda was an obscure battle outside South Asian security circles, at the time it was the largest tank battle since World War II.

During the battle, four Indian divisions attacked deep into Pakistani Punjab where they were repulsed by the skillful defense of Pakistan's 6 Armored Division. The ensuing stalemate ultimately convinced India to seek an end to the war.

Husain's definitive account, delayed for years by Pakistani Army censors because little had changed along the frontier between India and Pakistan, provides unprecedented insight into historical issues and current security concerns. Husain's self-criticisms of foregone opportunities, wrong tactics, neglected battle procedures, and poor leadership constitute a critique of the Pakistani Army that still applies. The book's tactical and operational detail complements Harbakhsh Singh's *War Dispatches—Indo-Pak Conflict 1965* (Lancer International, New Delhi, 1991), the only book with an Indian perspective about the fighting on the Western Front.

The book's annexes [appendices], which include operations orders, captured Indian documents, and comprehensively marked and scaled full-color foldout maps

(NATO standard), are superb. This well-written narrative might be best appreciated by someone with G3 experience.

**Julian Schofield, Ph.D.,
Montreal, Quebec**

RACING THE ENEMY: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan, Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2005, 382 pages, \$29.95.

Did the atomic bomb end the war in the Pacific? Tsuyoshi Hasegawa vehemently contends that U.S. President Harry S. Truman's use of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki did not play a major role in influencing the Japanese to surrender. Rather, Hasegawa argues, Russian dictator Joseph Stalin's decision to enter the war in the Pacific caused Japan's capitulation.

Backed by research in three languages (Russian, Japanese, and English), Hasegawa provides a critical assessment of the roles the atomic bomb and the Soviet Union played in the Pacific Theater at the end of World War II. Despite volumes of research and multiperspective accounts of the final months of the war, Hasegawa relies heavily on the theories advanced by Gar Alperovitz in *The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb* (Vintage, Westminster, MD, 1996).

Hasegawa details Japan's diplomatic overtures to the Soviet Union and Stalin's political maneuvering between his alliance with the United States and neutrality with Japan. Hasegawa concludes that the Soviet Union exercised great influence over the course of action in the Pacific and that the United States unnecessarily rushed to end the war with the atomic bomb.

Although firmly advocating the revisionist's well-trodden interpretation of the use of the atomic bomb, Hasegawa does contribute to the scholarship on the end of World War II. Specifically, he provides detailed analysis of the

tense negotiations between War Party and Peace Party factions in the Japanese Government over the decision to surrender.

Hasegawa supplements his analysis with a solid discussion of Stalin's diplomatic maneuvering and strategic decisions from the Potsdam Conference to Japan's signing of the terms of surrender on 2 September 1945. Of specific note is Hasegawa's analysis of the Soviet Union's hasty operations in the Kuril Islands as Stalin attempted to acquire as much territory as he could before the war ended.

While not as detailed as his analysis and discussion of the Japanese perspective, Hasegawa's treatment of the Soviet Union's motives provides a valuable additional perspective. Still, although it provides little new to the debate about the decision to use the atomic bomb, *Racing the Enemy* merits attention for its skillful discussion of the Japanese Government's negotiations prior to surrender and the Soviet Union's important role in ending the war in the Pacific.

**Sean N. Kalic,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

HOLDING JUNO: Canada's Heroic Defense of the D-Day Beaches June 7-12, 1944, Mark Zuehlke, Douglas & McIntyre, Vancouver, British Columbia, 2005, 424 pages, \$29.95.

Canadian Mark Zuehlke has written numerous books about the Canadian Armed Forces during World War II. *Holding Juno* is another well-researched history that readers will enjoy. Zuehlke had originally planned to combine the events of 7 to 12 June 1944 with his book on the Canadian experience during the Normandy invasion, but instead wrote two books. This one is an excellent companion to *Juno Beach, Canada's D-Day Victory: June 6, 1944* (Douglas & McIntyre, Vancouver, British Columbia, 2004).

Zuehlke adds significantly to the understanding of the Allies' con-

tributions during World War II, an area that is often overlooked and not fully appreciated. He tells the story of the initial battles between 3 Canadian Division and the German 12th SS Division in the crucial days following the invasion.

The Germans had moved up armored forces and immediately counterattacked the Canadians on 7 June when the Canadians were just short of their D-Day objectives. For the next 5 days the two sides fought vicious battles in the towns and fields near Caen. The Germans repeatedly tried to exploit the gap between Canadian and British forces and thus drive to the beachhead. The Canadian troops ultimately stalemated the Germans, preventing them from achieving their objectives.

Extensively researched, the book cites veterans' accounts and official records with stories told from both sides. Well-written and containing detailed maps, the book gives the reader a good idea of the battles' movements. Zuehlke concentrates on the battles involving the Canadian 3 Division as well as the contributions of other Canadian forces and services and describes accurately the war crimes the German 12th SS committed against the Canadians.

The book tells the story of the Canadian soldiers' sacrifices as they attempted to protect their assigned beachhead. Readers will find the descriptions of their desperate fight realistic.

**LTC Robert Rielly, USA,
Retired,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR, Donald Kagan, Viking, New York, 2003, 511 pages, \$29.95.

For most of their history, Greek city-states were obstreperous and feisty. Their favorite annual summertime ritual sport was war. Farmers donned their armor, arranged themselves into phalanxes, and charged each other. Battles were short and wars frequently

were decided in an afternoon. Brought together by the threat of an expansionist Persian Empire, these city-states formed an alliance to save themselves. After the threat passed, they split into two rival alliances, one led by Athens, the other by Sparta.

The Persian War was protracted and ferocious, but the conflict that erupted in 431 BCE lasted 27 years and left the Hellenic world in shambles. Donald Kagan, author of a four-volume study of the Peloponnesian War, has written a readable, single-volume history for the general reader. Kagan's major source is Thucydides, but he supplements Thucydides's account with those of Diodorus, Plutarch, and 19th- and 20th-century scholars.

The war was a contest between the Athenian and Spartan alliances. Athens was a democracy, strong at sea and the ruler of an empire. Sparta led an alliance of conservative cities strong on land and weak at sea. Kagan, drawing many comparisons between these coalitions and those that fought World War I, states that each war was a tragic event that ended a period of progress, prosperity, confidence, and hope.

Pericles believed Athens would win militarily if it followed an attrition strategy and that Athenian political ideals would prevail because Greeks would not respond to Spartan ideas with enthusiasm and empathy. However, the Athenian democracy would not follow a Periclean strategy, and Athens fell, losing its predominant political position in the Hellenic world and temporarily losing its political democracy. Kagan shows how arrogance, overreach, miscalculation, and the democratic system itself contributed to Athens' defeat.

Long wars acquire their own logic. The Peloponnesian War saw steady escalation and increased brutality. Volunteer soldiers became mercenaries, civilians were slaughtered, property was destroyed, and the corpses of the slain were desecrated, all departures from Greek warfare's

traditional norms. The war drove the Athenians to bankruptcy, while the conservative Spartans were forced to improvise and innovate. The Spartans created a fleet and sought a Persian alliance while the Athenians exerted greater pressure on their erstwhile allies.

Despite the Athenian defeat, Pericles's idea was vindicated because Sparta did not represent a unifying ideal. Athens regained its power (though not its former influence). The Spartans merely fought to preserve their way of life and enforced their hegemony solely by military means. The war saw the Persians gain strength as the Spartan alliance enabled them to conquer the Greek city-states in Asia Minor.

Kagan promises his audience a readable narrative and delivers it in a series of short chapters explaining Greek political complexities and the military campaigns. The book is replete with maps, now rare in military history books, which help one understand the course of events and the reasons behind the various strategies. This book deserves a wide readership because while much has changed in war, much remains the same.

**Lewis Bernstein,
Seoul, Republic of Korea**

THE WAR FOR MUSLIM MINDS: Islam and the West, Gilles Kepel, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2004, 327 pages, \$23.95.

The United States and its allies are succeeding in many aspects of the Global War on Terrorism. Kinetic options have shocked the Taliban out of power with a combination of local air, Special Forces, and Pakistani and local Afghan allies.

Security forces can secure the homeland and keep terrorists always on the move, but what is lacking is a robust counter-ideological campaign to discredit the body of tracts, booklets, and pamphlets that Kepel discusses in *The*

War for Muslim Minds. Kepel ranks among the top French thinkers on Islamic militancy. His book *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam* (Belknap Press, Cambridge, MA, 2003) assesses the evolution of Islamic militant movements with a concentration on those located in Central Asia.

A main criticism of the current book is that although it describes ideological texts and offers a fresh look at the writings of Ayman Al-Zawahiri, it offers no recommendations or policy suggestions on how to counter them. Kepel's analysis of Al-Zawahiri (a prolific writer and chief strategist of Al Qaeda) is that Al-Zawahiri's core ideology revolves around the concept of "commanding good and forbidding evil."

Islam's golden age was between 627 and 655 A.D., when the positive forces of righteousness brought down the corrupt forces of ancient Byzantium and Persia. (The jihad against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan was a reinterpretation of this founding conflict in early Islam.) Their single-minded focus on piety and faith, however, negated the actual operational tactics of early Muslim armies. Al-Zawahiri's entire scenario—caves, outfits, and turbans—is designed to create a 21st-century version of early-Islamic history and specifically of the moment when the Prophet Muhammad left behind the corruption and murder of Mecca and immigrated to Medina to found a new society and wage war on the corrupt.

Kepel does not attempt to rationalize Muhammad's political decisions, the method by which he was selected to be the leader of Medina, or how he brought together the Muslims, Jews, and animists living in Medina. Some of Kepel's translations are debatable, including his reference to Abdel-Salam Faraj's Islamic militant booklet *Al-Farida Al-Ghaiba* as the "hidden imperative"; it is better translated as the "missing obligation" (a reference to jihad). He also incorrectly says Paul Wolfowitz was the U.S. Assistant

Defense Secretary, when he was actually the U.S. Deputy Defense Secretary.

Kepel's chapter on Wahabism discusses the radicalization of Islam for tribal political ends. Modern Saudi clerics such as Sheikh Safar Hawali and Salman Al-Auda have influenced the ultra-Wahabi and Salafi views of terrorists like Osama bin-Laden. These clerics represent the cutting edge and logical evolution of Wahabi theology in Arabia. Kepel accurately portrays the Egyptian, Syrian, and Iraqi Islamic radical influences (escaping Nasser and Baathism) that cross-pollinated jihadist ideas in Arabia in the 1960s and 1970s.

The final chapters discuss how Islamic radicalism affects Europe and critically assess U.S. operations in Iraq. Kepel's criticism of the coalition's intervention in Iraq discusses how this might exacerbate the problems of jihadism, but he fails to recognize how Operation Iraqi Freedom is compelling Muslims to find Islamic militancy unacceptable. Still, I recommend Kepel's book to those involved in counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and intelligence, and to foreign area officers specializing in the Middle East.

**LCDR Youssef Aboul-Enein,
MSC, USN,
Gaithersburg, Maryland**

**THE MAN WHO INVENTED
HITLER: The Making of the
Führer**, David Lewis, Trafalgar
Square, North Pomfret, VT, 2004,
336 pages, \$35.00.

In *The Man Who Invented Hitler*, David Lewis suggests that Adolf Hitler's personality was altered because of a treatment he received for a seemingly hysteria-induced blindness following World War I. Despite being an Austrian citizen, Hitler had served in a Bavarian unit during the war, where he was temporarily blinded during a chemical gas attack. Lewis argues that Hitler's treatment by psychiatrist Edmund Forster had the greatest effect on the dictator's

future. Lewis illuminates Hitler's and Forster's lives before, during, and after the war.

Although Lewis's work is interesting, he does not give a satisfactory explanation for why he believes Forster so affected Hitler's future. His research suffers from the same shortcoming that psychohistory in general seems to suffer from—that without putting an individual on the couch, it is impossible to make more than an educated guess about what is going on in a person's head. Moreover, imposing psychological values from one time period onto another is dubious methodology and leads to misunderstanding. Although the book is valuable based on its new analysis, it should not be treated as a biography of Hitler exclusive of all others.

**David J. Schepp,
Columbus, Georgia**

**SEPARATED AT BIRTH: How
North Korea Became the Evil
Twin**, Gordon Cucullu, The Lyons
Press, Guilford, CN, 2004, 352
pages, \$24.95.

North Korea, a country that U.S. President George W. Bush characterizes as part of an "axis of evil," largely remains an enigma that puzzles most Americans. Likewise for many military historians as well as the general audience, the Korean War stands as perhaps one of the least analyzed and least understood conflicts our Nation has experienced. In a compelling personal account, Gordon Cucullu provides riveting insight into the war.

Chronicling his military career as a Special Forces officer and foreign affairs analyst, Cucullu recounts cultural and geopolitical events that led to Korea's separation in 1945 and concludes with the present nuclear dilemma. His perspectives, historically accurate and well developed, succinctly illustrate the challenges the United States faces in dealing with a rogue regime.

Tracing the roots of the Korean conundrum, beginning with the peninsula's fairly arbitrary division at the conclusion of World War II by the Allied powers, Cucullu asserts that America was not prepared to occupy or competently govern Korea after the war (while the Soviets were) and that America lacked the cultural awareness and expertise to effectively transition Korea to a democratic nation. Too many U.S. foreign policy experts and resources were focused on Japan.

For many years North Korea's primary focus was to defeat South Korea militarily. As a result of corruption and the self-serving policies of its communist regime, it became a desperately poor nation, economically and politically estranged from the rest of the world. And, while there seems to be frequent interest in and dialog about a unified Korea (vis-à-vis East and West Germany), South Koreans dread the enormous cost of rebuilding North Korea. Hence the call for reunification has been tempered by the fear of having to foot the bill in full for ending the separation of the two Koreas.

Cucullu addresses the Korean War only in passing; the book's principal focus and strength lie in his cogent analysis of the political and cultural evolution that has propelled the two Koreas along divergent pathways. Although neither China nor the Soviet Union want North Korea to possess nuclear capability, North Korea's leaders are aggressively pursuing it. They are bankrupting the country in their singular pursuit of military power. Cucullu says: "The people are uniformly repressed. Virtually nothing is spent on infrastructure improvements or on standard of living upgrades." Satellite images showing the absence of electricity in North Korea suggest that this claim is true.

While Cucullu provides few solutions for resolving the issue, he argues effectively that multilateral talks with North Korea, in which China plays a key role, are essential to solving the dilemma and bringing to an end the government's decades-long

subjugation of the people. Despite its unapologetically hawkish tone, Cucullu's analysis is, on the whole, balanced and consistent. Ultimately, *Separated at Birth* is a must-read for military professionals. Cucullu's revelations into the nuances of a largely unknown people and culture give depth and perspective to the difficulties the United States faces in the region and highlight foreign policy issues that directly affect us.

**LTC Jonathan M. Williams,
USA, Retired,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

THE FIRST WAY OF WAR, John Grenier, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2005, 232 pages, \$19.80.

In *The First Way of War*, John Grenier examines warfare in America between 1607 and 1814. Early Americans, he claims, created a violent military tradition that "accepted, legitimized, and encouraged attacks [on] noncombatants, villages, and agricultural resources" and went against the civilized Cavalier grain of the European military tradition. Grenier contends that this distinctly American tradition remained the predominant way of war until 1814.

Grenier poses a series of questions that revolve around one query: "Where does war waged against noncombatants fit into America's martial culture?" He answers that "American soldiers killing noncombatants is nothing new"; it is not an outgrowth or legacy of the American Civil War, as historians like Russell Weigley suggest.

The book's strength lies in its recognition and treatment of the asymmetrical dimension of war as it relates to societies and cultures in general. Grenier ably depicts the maturation process Euroamericans underwent as they experienced, befriended, and warred with Native Americans.

By highlighting the genesis of Ranger and light infantry regi-

ments and the inculcation of societal practices such as the killing of noncombatants associated with frontier warfare, he explains how the cultural encounters became more violent. By the early 19th century, actions once thought by professional soldiers to be taboo, such as scalp hunting, became common practice in North America. Grenier ties his history to the ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, skillfully arguing that what contemporary American professionals now see as atypical warfare has clear historical precedent.

Grenier's book is lucid and well written, but as with most works attempting to rewrite historiography, his argument is shallow in some areas. His contention that 17th- and 18th-century colonial militia, essentially shopkeepers, smithies, and farmers, somehow constituted a professional military establishment, is a bit of a stretch. Also, what Grenier sees as the indoctrination of America's professional Army with this vicious mode of warfare is problematic, especially when looking at the American Revolution, since George Washington and other generals attempted to style their forces and practice warfare along European lines.

Grenier's thesis has a much broader applicability. What he views as America's first way of war is actually a Euroamerican style of colonization and conquest. What he sees as limited, violent wars actually involved Native American groups such as the Powhatans fighting for their survival. Despite these shortcomings, I recommend this book.

**MAJ Joseph P. Alessi, USA,
Fort Carson, Colorado**

T.E. LAWRENCE, Malcolm Brown, New York University Press, NY, 2003, 160 pages, \$21.95.

T.E. Lawrence is best known as Lawrence of Arabia, the soldier-scholar who helped lead the Arab Revolt of 1917-1918 and

helped shape the modern Middle East. In the 1960s, Lawrence was immortalized in an epic movie of the same name. Yet despite his fame and grandiose title, he remains one of modern history's most controversial and enigmatic figures.

As Malcolm Brown demonstrates in this concise but richly illustrated new biography, Lawrence inspired conflicting responses from those who knew him. One of his superiors, a brigadier in the British forces in Egypt, described Lawrence as a "bumptious young ass," opinionated, disrespectful, and disheveled. At the Paris Peace Conference following World War I, famous Arabist Gertrude Bell called him the "most picturesque figure" in attendance. After Lawrence's death, Winston Churchill offered this glowing eulogy: "In Colonel Lawrence we have lost one of the greatest beings of our time."

So, who was he really? Brown has written at length elsewhere on this subject, first in *A Touch of Genius: The Life of T.E. Lawrence* (J.M. Dent, London, 1988), and later in *T.E. Lawrence: The Selected Letters* (Oxford University Press, New York, 1991). However, the best Brown can do within the slim dimensions of his current book is sketch out some of the conclusions he has drawn from his earlier work.

As part of the "Historic Lives" series of short biographies, the book has no room for lengthy psychoanalysis. Nor is there room for a detailed description of Lawrence's military adventures. Instead, the book outlines Lawrence's career, illuminated by cleverly chosen vignettes, revealing quotes, and well-chosen photographs.

The book's portraits and photographs help us get at the mystery of this curious man. We see Lawrence staring out from the dust jacket, a homely face under a fancy Arab headdress; the melancholy eyes seem to stare at some place far beyond us. Later, we find an exhausted but eager Lawrence being driven into Damascus: It

is the final phase of Lawrence's greatest triumph as General Edmond Allenby completes his victorious 1918 campaign against the Turks.

A few days later, Lawrence was on his way back to England, having judged his mission a failure. Farther on, in a chapter that describes Lawrence's strange and lonely postwar career, we see a pensive Lawrence dressed in a Royal Air Force enlisted man's uniform standing on an Indian airstrip looking off into the distance. This little book should inspire readers to learn more about Lawrence and that is the true measure of the author's success.

**LTC Scott Stephenson, USA,
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Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

**A WORLD CHALLENGED:
Fighting Terrorism in the Twenty-
First Century**, Yevgeny M. Primakov, The Nixon Center and Brookings Institution Press, Washington, D.C., 2004, 150 pages, \$22.95.

Yevgeny M. Primakov, former Russian Premier and Intelligence Services chief, offers a sobering account of the Russian perspective on the state of terrorism in the world today while addressing the global challenges we face as terrorism evolves in the wake of recent events. In *A World Challenged*, Primakov draws on a wealth of knowledge and experience to present an alternate view of the war on terrorism, and he does so with remarkable frankness and clarity of thought. His opinions, often controversial yet universally intriguing, are timely and relevant to our efforts to stem the tide of violence that continues to put innocent lives at risk across the world.

Primakov, like most of us, views the lingering state of conflict throughout much of the Middle East as the nexus of terrorist training and activity. He recognizes Al Qaeda as the most significant contemporary threat, but warns that it is but one organi-

zation among a multitude seeking the means to wreak havoc, foster anarchy, and collapse world order. However, his belief that the UN can influence events on a world scale with an international code of conduct is naively optimistic for a leader of his prominence and a man with his background in intelligence.

Primakov is at his best when he assesses the current state of affairs from his perspective as an intelligence director. First and foremost, he highlights the same absence of information sharing, albeit on an international level, that plagues our national efforts to forestall terrorist efforts. With terrorist organizations no longer tethered to nation-states, methods and agendas have transformed on an unprecedented scale. The threat these organizations pose to global security can only be countered by an international effort led, of course, by the American and Russian governments.

A World Challenged is a candid work by an intriguing and compelling author. Primakov pulls no punches here and frequently points out that our weaknesses and operational tendencies have often produced disastrous indirect effects. Readers will find his opinions thought-provoking and worthy of further discussion. *A World Challenged* is an excellent companion to the *9/11 Commission Report* (W.W. Norton & Company, New York, 2004) and a must-read for anyone concerned with the future of global security.

**MAJ Steve Leonard, USA,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**